A group of documents recently circulating online has stoked apprehension about a new wave of pressure on tools used to circumvent China’s Great Firewall. One memo, from online services provider Qihang CDN, warns that based on directions from its own upstream service provider, Shaanxi Telecom, business customers may not use Qihang’s infrastructure to make international data connections. The notice appears to target operators of “airport” circumvention services (see below). This scope is key: the memo does not suggest a total block on international browsing by ordinary web users, for example. CDT Chinese editors have received corroborating reports of similar notices from other sources.
Emergency Notice on Comprehensively Blocking International Traffic and Strictly Prohibiting Firewall-circumvention Services
Greetings:
In accordance with the latest requirements received from Shaanxi Telecom:
As of today, all IP addresses must completely block access to addresses outside the Chinese mainland, and international traffic must be blocked without exception. This includes, but is not limited to: Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, and all other countries and regions. At the same time, it is strictly forbidden to host any kind of firewall circumvention-related service such as VPNs, proxies, etc.
All users, please carry out immediate self-inspection, focused on identifying the following:
- Services for accessing or relaying traffic outside mainland China
- Applications or activity involving VPNs, proxies, firewall-circumvention, etc.
- Abnormalities in up- or downstream traffic (such as peering, tunneling, etc.)
Enforcement:
- Detection of unauthorized firewall-circumvention or international traffic will result in immediate termination (IP blocked, server shut down)
- Data will not be retained after termination; backups must be completed beforehand.
- All consequences of suspension and termination resulting from unauthorized usage are the user’s responsibility. Our company assumes no responsibility.
- Past payments will not be refunded, and there will be no compensation for unused resources.
- No replacement, adjustment, or refund will be available under any circumstances for loss or disruption of existing services due to blocking of international traffic.
- Any subsequent lifting of the ban will be subject to notification from [Shaanxi] Telecom; our company [Qihang CDN] can offer no assurances.
Please treat this matter seriously and carry out immediate rectification to avoid unnecessary losses.
Thank you for your support and cooperation!
March 31, 2026 [Chinese]
Another of the documents is a purported invitation from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology to a meeting on "strengthening management of unauthorized internet connections via dedicated cross-border data lines," a focus which suggests that the above corporate memo reflects a broader, coordinated strategy.
Memo from the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
Meeting Notice
China Telecom Corp. Ltd.; China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd.; China United Network Communications Group Co., Ltd.:
In order to strengthen management of unauthorized Internet connections via dedicated cross-border data lines, this office is convening a special meeting in room D103 of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology’s Xidan offices at 16:00 on Tuesday, April 7.
Supervisors from your work unit’s departments for planning and construction, network operations, and government and enterprise are requested to attend and bring relevant written documentation to the meeting. Please provide our office with attendees’ details by 14:00 on Tuesday, April 7.
[Seal: Bureau of Information and Communications Management, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology]
April 7, 2026
(Contact person and telephone [redacted])
CC: Cybersecurity Bureau [Chinese]
A third document is a purported invitation to a seminar on "Deep Study and Implementation of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Key Thoughts on National Cyber Power" at the Cyberspace Administration of China. The invitation’s contents do not establish a direct link with the "airports" crackdown, but reflect the same climate of steadily tightening control.
Letter of Invitation to a Symposium on In-depth Study and Implementation of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Key Thoughts on National Cyber Power
Comrade [redacted]:
In order to deepen study and implementation of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s key thoughts on national cyber power, the CAC has scheduled a symposium on that topic for 9:00 a.m. on Thursday, April 16 in meeting room 125 at our offices at 11 Chegongzhuang Avenue, Xicheng District [in Beijing]. The comrade with relevant responsibilities from [redacted] is cordially invited to attend; please fax the attached registration form to [redacted] by April 7.
Attendees are requested to arrive at the venue 20 minutes early to complete registration, and to leave cellphones in the security locker at the entrance and remain in the meeting room during the session. Your understanding and cooperation are appreciated.
Contact: [Name redacted] [Phone number redacted]
[Seal: CAC Secretariat]April 2, 2026 [Chinese]
Jessica Batke and Laura Edelson described "airport" services as follows last year in their ChinaFile report, "The Locknet: How China Controls Its Internet and Why It Matters" (which they discussed in an interview with CDT):
These black-market circumvention services are euphemistically known as “airports” in China, because they connect users to a foreign internet. Such black-market services “always exist when there are barriers to and obstacles to what people want to do, and there’s an opportunity to arbitrage against that with a superior product,” notes Boehler, the media researcher. It’s hard to get a precise fix on how many such “airport” providers are out there—dozens? hundreds?—but the advertisements they post offer some insights into the scale of the market. For one, the advertised prices are quite low, with monthly fees ranging from 15 to 188 renminbi (approximately U.S.$2 to U.S.$26). “If you’re doing something that’s illegal, and the pricing is really low, that is an indication it’s so widespread you can monetize it at that level.” For another, the variety of offerings suggests a highly sophisticated, diversified, and “kind of pervasive” market. “There’s a lot of pricing competition, competition around features, countries you can tunnel into, the amount of servers they have, the throughput in terms of traffic,” Boehler explains.
Individual airports can serve thousands or even tens of thousands of customers, according to local governments that have prosecuted sellers. They can also provide the technical know-how to less tech-savvy users in order to successfully set up their services. “That’s exactly why [airports] exist,” says Boehler. “They don’t require any technical knowledge or paperwork or anything. You just go to Taobao or wherever, you buy a box and connect the box to your WiFi, and you have streaming services on your TV.” In fact, the relative ease of using these services “means that people might not be aware that they’re using airports. They might think they just bought a box. [They’re not thinking] ‘I’m subverting the Communist Party,’ but ‘I just want to watch Netflix.’ [The providers] don’t have to put a warning label, like ‘You’re committing a crime!’” (The unofficial nature of the airport market also gives scammers ample opportunity to bilk money from would-be users.) Source
Last November, China Media Project’s David Bandurski noted a warning from an AI-generated spokesperson for the Ministry of State Security against this and other dangers of "scaling the wall." At China Law Translate in February, Jeremy Daum noted the possibility that the new draft Cybercrime Law could bring further pressure on circumvention tools and services:
Some of the restrictions mentioned above touch on the use of VPNs and proxies, which are of particular concern because they are used by many to circumvent content restrictions and access foreign sites.
Losing access to effective VPNs and being cut off from the global web is a regular concern for many based in China. It is not entirely unfounded, as longstanding rules prohibit the unauthorized establishment of international connections or circumvention tools, and there have been periodic crackdowns reported. Enforcement tends to target those creating, selling, or providing others with circumvention tools, but there are confirmed incidents of people being fined for simply using such tools.
In the context of this draft, however, it is far from clear that there is an intention to move VPN usage further out of the gray area and towards a full prohibition, but it is worth following closely. [Source]