Last week, Beijing hosted the fourth China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum. While this triennial gathering was described as a ministerial-level meeting, the presidents of Brazil, Colombia, and Chile attended, showing their commitment to deepen ties with China. In the backdrop were American tariffs and U.S.-China geopolitical competition, two factors that have ramped up pressure on CELAC members. At Dialogue Earth, Fermín Koop, Jack Lo Lau, and Juan Ortiz described the outcome of the forum and noted its emphasis on multilateralism, which was perhaps a subtle signal of the region’s unease with rising U.S. trade barriers:

President Xi’s speech included the announcement of a CNY 66 billion (USD 9.15 billion) credit line to support development in CELAC countries. This figure is slightly less than half that pledged at the 2015 summit.

“Although China and the LAC [Latin America and Caribbean] region are geographically distant, the bonds of our friendship stretch back through centuries,” Xi said. “Together, China and LAC countries champion true multilateralism, uphold international fairness and justice, advance global governance reform, and promote global multipolarity and greater democracy in international relations.”

[…] In a 28-point joint statement issued late on Tuesday, the China-CELAC Forum underlined its commitment to multilateralism and international cooperation, and to “strengthening all pillars of the climate change mechanism”.

Rebecca Ray, senior academic researcher for the Boston University Global Development Policy Center, [stated]: “With trade barriers all over the place, it’s an important moment to come together and reaffirm commitment to multilateralism. The region is committing to pragmatic, open, non-discriminatory relations with the world to achieve its goals.” [Source]

Many reactions to the forum revolved around the issue of trade. In an editorial explaining “why [the] China-CELAC Beijing Declaration has earned warm applause,” the Global Times wrote that China “reaffirms support for a fair, transparent, and rules-based multilateral trading system.” Former Chilean Ambassador to China Jorge Heine expressed his country’s worries to state-media outlet CGTN: “We believe very strongly in free trade and our economy depends on free trade. […The] dismantling of the existing trading order is very problematic.” A headline figure often cited last week was that trade between China and LAC countries exceeded $500 billion for the first time in 2024. Some coverage also noted that China’s courting of the region may dovetail with Beijing’s desire to undermine ties between LAC countries and Taiwan, for Latin America and the Caribbean are home to seven of the 12 countries that have official ties to Taiwan. At the Atlantic Council, Parsifal D’Sola argued that the forum actually revealed China’s dual-track strategy of symbolic multilateralism and pragmatic bilateral cooperation, for certain LAC countries that managed to take advantage of the trade and investment opportunities:

The clearest signals came not from the multilateral setting but from bilateral tracks—especially Brazil and Chile. Both countries sent their presidents accompanied by large, high-level delegations. The presence of Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, alongside nine of his ministers, underscored Brazil’s intent to deepen ties with China through structured, bilateral channels. The contrast with his visits to the United States is stark: all of Lula’s trips to Washington have involved significantly smaller delegations, often limited to a handful of advisers. That disparity speaks volumes about where Brazil sees its strategic priorities.

Chile followed a similar playbook, arriving in Beijing prepared to engage substantively. These engagements signal that China is increasingly prioritizing bilateral diplomacy over regional multilateralism when it comes to tangible cooperation. Countries with a clear agenda and internal coordination—like Brazil and Chile—are well-positioned to benefit.

The forum revealed more about China’s dual-track approach—multilateral symbolism paired with bilateral pragmatism—than about any coordinated regional response to China’s rise. [Source]

The Economist reported earlier this month on new polling that suggests that citizens of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Venezuela believe China, more so than the U.S., respects Latin American countries and has “more fair and transparent trade practices.” (Some, but certainly not all of these soft-power gains are the result of China’s state-media cooperation with Brazilian media, as CDT covered last April.) Bárbara Fernández Melleda, an assistant professor in Latin American studies at the University of Hong Kong, told NBC, “What’s happening, not just in Latin America, is that countries are saying, ‘Well, if these big countries are getting hostile, we should just find other partnerships.’” Building on these wins, China also announced on Thursday that it will extend its visa-free policy to Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, effective from June 1 for one year.

But the positive image of China’s economic presence in Latin America has also been tarnished by some setbacks on the ground. In January, Chinese EV manufacturer BYD became embroiled in a labor-rights scandal that caused the Brazilian government to halt the company’s factory construction. The Chinese-backed Chancay megaport in Peru has generated controversies with local communities over who actually benefits from the project. And China’s “distant-water fishing” fleet continues to intrude into the territorial waters of Argentina and Peru, causing tensions with local fishermen.

To some extent, the BRI serves as a bellwether for China’s economic popularity in the region. Two-thirds of Latin American countries have already signed up to the BRI. Brazil declined to join last October, but it still maintains a strong partnership with China. Under pressure from the Trump administration, Panama announced in February that it would not renew its participation in the BRI. A major headline from last week’s forum was that Colombia announced it would join the BRI, a month after the International Monetary Fund suspended a credit line to Colombia due to concerns about the country’s deficit. Reuters provided more detail on Colombia’s decision to sign on with the BRI:

Colombia’s foreign minister Laura Sarabia said on Wednesday that the decision to join China’s flagship overseas development project was the South American country’s "boldest step in decades."

"The signing of this cooperation plan opens up a horizon of endless opportunities in trade, investment, and tourism. There is no turning back: Colombia is resolutely opening up to the world," Sarabia wrote on X.

[…Colombian President Gustavo] Petro, who took over in August 2022, made his first trip to China as president in October 2023, upgrading to a strategic partnership [the] two-way ties first established in 1980. [Source]